Goldman on probabilistic inference

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Abstract

In his recent book, Knowledge in a Social World, Alvin Goldman claims to have established that if a reasoner starts with accurate estimates of the reliability of new evidence and conditionalizes on this evidence, then this reasoner is objectively likely to end up closer to the truth. In this paper, I argue that Goldman's result is not nearly as philosophically significant as he would have us believe. First, accurately estimating the reliability of evidence - in the sense that Goldman requires - is not quite as easy as it might sound. Second, being objectively likely to end up closer to the truth - in the sense that Goldman establishes - is not quite as valuable as it might sound.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)223-240
Number of pages18
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume109
Issue number3
StatePublished - 2002

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Probabilistic Inference
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Social Worlds

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Cite this

Goldman on probabilistic inference. / Fallis, Don T.

In: Philosophical Studies, Vol. 109, No. 3, 2002, p. 223-240.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Fallis, Don T. / Goldman on probabilistic inference. In: Philosophical Studies. 2002 ; Vol. 109, No. 3. pp. 223-240.
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