Green's rights recognition thesis and moral internalism

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

T. H. Green claimed that 'rights are made by recognition. There is no right but thinking makes it so'. This 'rights recognition thesis' is widely rejected. I argue in this article that, so far from being an idiosyncratic doctrine of 19th-century British Idealism, the rights recognition thesis implies a compelling conception of rights, and one that, surprisingly, is more in tune with contemporary meta-ethics than are many contemporary rights theories. Green's moral theory, I argue, is a form of the widely embraced doctrine of 'moral internalism'. Such internalism, conjoined with a generally embraced analysis of rights, leads to some version of the rights recognition thesis.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)5-17
Number of pages13
JournalBritish Journal of Politics and International Relations
Volume7
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 2005
Externally publishedYes

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doctrine
idealism
moral philosophy
rights
thesis
ethics

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law
  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this

Green's rights recognition thesis and moral internalism. / Gaus, Gerald F.

In: British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 7, No. 1, 02.2005, p. 5-17.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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