Hide and seek in Arizona

Robert W. Rosenthal, Jason Shachat, Mark Walker

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

15 Scopus citations

Abstract

Laboratory subjects repeatedly played one of two variations of a simple two-person zero-sum game of "hide and seek". Three puzzling departures from the prescriptions of equilibrium theory are found in the data: an asymmetry related to the player's role in the game; an asymmetry across the game variations; and positive serial correlation in subjects' play. Possible explanations for these departures are considered.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)273-293
Number of pages21
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume32
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2003

Keywords

  • Experiment
  • Minimax
  • Mixed strategy

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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