How to be Realistic about Folk Psychology

George Graham, Terence Horgan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

Folk psychological realism is the view that folk psychology is true and that people really do have propositional attitudes, whereas anti-realism is the view that folk psychology is false and people really do not have propositional attitudes. We argue that anti-realism is not worthy of acceptance and that realism is eminently worthy of acceptance. However, it is plainly epistemically possible to favor either of two forms of folk realism: scientific or non-scientific. We argue that non-scientific realism, while perhaps unpopular among philosophers of mind, is a distinct form of realism from scientific realism, and that it is not yet knowable whether scientific or non-scientific realism is true. We also outline how adopting realism, but remaining neutral between scientific and non-scientific realism, offers fresh insights into such topics as instrumentalism, supervenience, the language of thought hypothesis, and eliminativism.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)69-81
Number of pages13
JournalPhilosophical Psychology
Volume1
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1988
Externally publishedYes

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Applied Psychology
  • Philosophy

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