How to be Realistic about Folk Psychology

George Graham, Terence E Horgan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Folk psychological realism is the view that folk psychology is true and that people really do have propositional attitudes, whereas anti-realism is the view that folk psychology is false and people really do not have propositional attitudes. We argue that anti-realism is not worthy of acceptance and that realism is eminently worthy of acceptance. However, it is plainly epistemically possible to favor either of two forms of folk realism: scientific or non-scientific. We argue that non-scientific realism, while perhaps unpopular among philosophers of mind, is a distinct form of realism from scientific realism, and that it is not yet knowable whether scientific or non-scientific realism is true. We also outline how adopting realism, but remaining neutral between scientific and non-scientific realism, offers fresh insights into such topics as instrumentalism, supervenience, the language of thought hypothesis, and eliminativism.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)69-81
Number of pages13
JournalPhilosophical Psychology
Volume1
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1988
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Psychology
Language
Realism
Folk Psychology
Scientific Realism
Acceptance
Anti-realism
Folk
Propositional Attitudes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Applied Psychology

Cite this

How to be Realistic about Folk Psychology. / Graham, George; Horgan, Terence E.

In: Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 1, No. 1, 01.01.1988, p. 69-81.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Graham, George ; Horgan, Terence E. / How to be Realistic about Folk Psychology. In: Philosophical Psychology. 1988 ; Vol. 1, No. 1. pp. 69-81.
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