Ideal equilibria in noncooperative multicriteria games

Mark Voorneveld, Sofia Grahn, Martin Dufwenberg

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

29 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Pareto equilibria in multicriteria games can be computed as the Nash equilibria of scalarized games, obtained by assigning weights to the separate criteria of a player. To analysts, these weights are usually unknown. This paper therefore proposes ideal equilibria, strategy profiles that are robust against unilateral deviations of the players no matter what importance is assigned to the criteria. Existence of ideal equilibria is not guaranteed, but several desirable properties are provided. As opposed to the computation of other solution concepts in noncooperative multicriteria games, the computation of the set of ideal equilibria is relatively simple: an exact upper bound for the number of scalarizations is the maximum number of criteria of the players. The ideal equilibrium concept is axiomatized. Moreover, the final section provides a non-trivial class of multicriteria games in which ideal equilibria exist, by establishing a link to the literature on potential games.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)65-77
Number of pages13
JournalMathematical Methods of Operations Research
Volume52
Issue number1
StatePublished - 2000
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Multicriteria Games
Non-cooperative Game
Potential Games
Scalarization
Solution Concepts
Pareto
Nash Equilibrium
Multi-criteria
Deviation
Game
Upper bound
Unknown

Keywords

  • Equilibrium concept
  • Ideal equilibria
  • Multicriteria games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

Ideal equilibria in noncooperative multicriteria games. / Voorneveld, Mark; Grahn, Sofia; Dufwenberg, Martin.

In: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Vol. 52, No. 1, 2000, p. 65-77.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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