Immunity to error as an artefact of transition between representational media

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Introduction It is often claimed that there is a range of self-ascriptions that are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun (IEM for short). Philosophical interest in IEM is usually traced to Wittgenstein's remarks in The Blue Book. He writes: It is possible that, say in an accident, I should feel a pain in my arm, see a broken arm at my side, and think it is mine, when really it is my neighbours… On the other hand, there is no question of recognising a person when I say I have toothache. To ask “are you sure that it is you who have pains?” would be nonsensical… And now this way of stating our idea suggests itself: that it is as impossible that in making the statement “I have a toothache” I should have mistaken another person for myself, as it is to moan with pain by mistake, having mistaken someone else for me. Shoemaker 1968 defines the susceptibility to error through misidentification thus, “to say that a statement ‘a is j’ is subject to error through misidentification relative to the term a means that the following is possible: the speaker knows some particular thing to be j, but makes the mistake of asserting ‘a is j’ because, and only because, he mistakenly thinks that the thing he knows to be j is what ‘a’ refers to.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationImmunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays
PublisherCambridge University Press
Pages62-80
Number of pages19
ISBN (Print)9781139043274, 9780521198301
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2012

Fingerprint

Immunity
Pain
Artifact
Person
Mistakes
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Neighbors
Accidents
Susceptibility
First Person Pronoun

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

Ismael, J. . (2012). Immunity to error as an artefact of transition between representational media. In Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays (pp. 62-80). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139043274.005

Immunity to error as an artefact of transition between representational media. / Ismael, Jenann -.

Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge University Press, 2012. p. 62-80.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Ismael, J 2012, Immunity to error as an artefact of transition between representational media. in Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge University Press, pp. 62-80. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139043274.005
Ismael J. Immunity to error as an artefact of transition between representational media. In Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. 2012. p. 62-80 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139043274.005
Ismael, Jenann -. / Immunity to error as an artefact of transition between representational media. Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge University Press, 2012. pp. 62-80
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