Imperfect alternatives: Institutional choice and the reform of investment law

Sergio Puig, Gregory Shaffer

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

28 Scopus citations

Abstract

This Article applies the theory of comparative institutional analysis to evaluate the trade-offs associated with alternative mechanisms for resolving investment disputes. We assess the trade-offs in light of the principle of accountability under the rule of law, which underpins the goals of fairness, efficiency, and peace that are attributed to investment law. The Article makes two recommendations: First, reforms should address complementarity between domestic and international institutions; second, institutional choices should respond to the different contexts that states face.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)361-409
Number of pages49
JournalAmerican Journal of International Law
Volume112
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1 2018

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Political Science and International Relations
  • Law

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