Information disclosure in auctions

An experiment

Martin Dufwenberg, Uri Gneezy

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

48 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We report experimental results on the importance of information disclosure policy in first-price sealed-bid auctions. Interaction takes place in 10 periods according to a random-matching protocol, and we control the level of information feedback bidders receive after each period. When bidders are informed about the losing bids in previous periods, prices are higher than the theoretical prediction. However, when this information is not revealed the bidding becomes more competitive, and the bids come close to the theoretical prediction. We suggest that a signaling phenomenon may be important for explaining these results.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)431-444
Number of pages14
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume48
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - 2002
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Information disclosure
Prediction
Bid
Experiment
Auctions
Interaction
Disclosure policy
Bidding
First-price sealed-bid auction
Random matching

Keywords

  • Experiment
  • First-price auctions
  • Information disclosure
  • Signaling

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Information disclosure in auctions : An experiment. / Dufwenberg, Martin; Gneezy, Uri.

In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 48, No. 4, 2002, p. 431-444.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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