Intentional Vagueness

Andreas - Blume, Oliver Board

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper analyzes communication with a language that is vague in the sense that identical messages do not always result in identical interpretations. It is shown that strategic agents frequently add to this vagueness by being intentionally vague, i.e. they deliberately choose less precise messages than they have to among the ones available to them in equilibrium. Having to communicate with a vague language can be welfare enhancing because it mitigates conflict. In equilibria that satisfy a dynamic stability condition intentional vagueness increases with the degree of conflict between sender and receiver.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)855-899
Number of pages45
JournalErkenntnis
Volume79
Issue numberS4
DOIs
StatePublished - 2014

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Vagueness
Welfare
Stability Condition
Receiver
Choose
Language
Conflict
Communication
Interpretation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Logic

Cite this

Intentional Vagueness. / Blume, Andreas -; Board, Oliver.

In: Erkenntnis, Vol. 79, No. S4, 2014, p. 855-899.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Blume, A & Board, O 2014, 'Intentional Vagueness', Erkenntnis, vol. 79, no. S4, pp. 855-899. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9468-x
Blume, Andreas - ; Board, Oliver. / Intentional Vagueness. In: Erkenntnis. 2014 ; Vol. 79, No. S4. pp. 855-899.
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