Introduction

David Sobel, Steven P Wall

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Philosophical reflection on practical reason and practical rationality is expanding in all directions. The work being done under these headings has become so broad and diverse that it is difficult to say much useful about the whole area. We will not try. Rather we shall pick a few points of entry into the discussions and try to situate some of the chapters in this volume within these frameworks. PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL RATIONALITY Normative reasons are facts that count in favor of doing some action, believing some claim, or having some attitude or emotion. Rationality refers to a capacity to recognize and respond appropriately to these facts (or one's take on these facts). There can be more or less demanding standards of rationality. On a common view, a person acts rationally if she does something that, were her beliefs true, she would have sufficient reason to do. On this view, what it is rational for a person to do depends on her beliefs. This brings out an important dependence of practical rationality on theoretical rationality. It is natural to wonder how significant are the differences between practical and theoretical rationality. Recently, some philosophers have argued that the differences are not as significant as they first appear. The demands of practical rationality, they argue, can be explained in terms of the requirements of theoretical rationality.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationReasons for Action
PublisherCambridge University Press
Pages1-12
Number of pages12
ISBN (Print)9780511720185, 9780521877466
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2009
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Rationality
Practical Rationality
Person
Practical Reason
Normative Reasons
Emotion
Philosopher

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

Sobel, D., & Wall, S. P. (2009). Introduction. In Reasons for Action (pp. 1-12). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511720185.001

Introduction. / Sobel, David; Wall, Steven P.

Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press, 2009. p. 1-12.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Sobel, D & Wall, SP 2009, Introduction. in Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-12. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511720185.001
Sobel D, Wall SP. Introduction. In Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press. 2009. p. 1-12 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511720185.001
Sobel, David ; Wall, Steven P. / Introduction. Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press, 2009. pp. 1-12
@inbook{61627432ff914b50b473a2abbdae2e87,
title = "Introduction",
abstract = "Philosophical reflection on practical reason and practical rationality is expanding in all directions. The work being done under these headings has become so broad and diverse that it is difficult to say much useful about the whole area. We will not try. Rather we shall pick a few points of entry into the discussions and try to situate some of the chapters in this volume within these frameworks. PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL RATIONALITY Normative reasons are facts that count in favor of doing some action, believing some claim, or having some attitude or emotion. Rationality refers to a capacity to recognize and respond appropriately to these facts (or one's take on these facts). There can be more or less demanding standards of rationality. On a common view, a person acts rationally if she does something that, were her beliefs true, she would have sufficient reason to do. On this view, what it is rational for a person to do depends on her beliefs. This brings out an important dependence of practical rationality on theoretical rationality. It is natural to wonder how significant are the differences between practical and theoretical rationality. Recently, some philosophers have argued that the differences are not as significant as they first appear. The demands of practical rationality, they argue, can be explained in terms of the requirements of theoretical rationality.",
author = "David Sobel and Wall, {Steven P}",
year = "2009",
month = "1",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1017/CBO9780511720185.001",
language = "English (US)",
isbn = "9780511720185",
pages = "1--12",
booktitle = "Reasons for Action",
publisher = "Cambridge University Press",

}

TY - CHAP

T1 - Introduction

AU - Sobel, David

AU - Wall, Steven P

PY - 2009/1/1

Y1 - 2009/1/1

N2 - Philosophical reflection on practical reason and practical rationality is expanding in all directions. The work being done under these headings has become so broad and diverse that it is difficult to say much useful about the whole area. We will not try. Rather we shall pick a few points of entry into the discussions and try to situate some of the chapters in this volume within these frameworks. PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL RATIONALITY Normative reasons are facts that count in favor of doing some action, believing some claim, or having some attitude or emotion. Rationality refers to a capacity to recognize and respond appropriately to these facts (or one's take on these facts). There can be more or less demanding standards of rationality. On a common view, a person acts rationally if she does something that, were her beliefs true, she would have sufficient reason to do. On this view, what it is rational for a person to do depends on her beliefs. This brings out an important dependence of practical rationality on theoretical rationality. It is natural to wonder how significant are the differences between practical and theoretical rationality. Recently, some philosophers have argued that the differences are not as significant as they first appear. The demands of practical rationality, they argue, can be explained in terms of the requirements of theoretical rationality.

AB - Philosophical reflection on practical reason and practical rationality is expanding in all directions. The work being done under these headings has become so broad and diverse that it is difficult to say much useful about the whole area. We will not try. Rather we shall pick a few points of entry into the discussions and try to situate some of the chapters in this volume within these frameworks. PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL RATIONALITY Normative reasons are facts that count in favor of doing some action, believing some claim, or having some attitude or emotion. Rationality refers to a capacity to recognize and respond appropriately to these facts (or one's take on these facts). There can be more or less demanding standards of rationality. On a common view, a person acts rationally if she does something that, were her beliefs true, she would have sufficient reason to do. On this view, what it is rational for a person to do depends on her beliefs. This brings out an important dependence of practical rationality on theoretical rationality. It is natural to wonder how significant are the differences between practical and theoretical rationality. Recently, some philosophers have argued that the differences are not as significant as they first appear. The demands of practical rationality, they argue, can be explained in terms of the requirements of theoretical rationality.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84927085138&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84927085138&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1017/CBO9780511720185.001

DO - 10.1017/CBO9780511720185.001

M3 - Chapter

AN - SCOPUS:84927085138

SN - 9780511720185

SN - 9780521877466

SP - 1

EP - 12

BT - Reasons for Action

PB - Cambridge University Press

ER -