Introspection about Phenomenal Consciousness: Running the Gamut from Infallibility to Impotence

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This chapter's project is to critically scrutinize the idea that because the intrinsic character of phenomenal consciousness is self-presenting, introspection concerning current phenomenal character is an extremely reliable belief-forming process, perhaps even an infallible one. The chapter argues that there are (at least) three kinds of introspectively produced phenomenal beliefs: (1) ones that are especially reliable, (2) ones that are outright infallible, and (3) ones that are not reliable on the basis of introspection alone. To illustrate type (3), the chapter argues that introspection by itself is virtually impotent as way to form certain sorts of beliefs about the intrinsic character of agentive phenomenology.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationIntrospection and Consciousness
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Print)9780199933396, 9780199744794
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 20 2012

Fingerprint

Introspection
Gamut
Impotence
Phenomenal Consciousness
Infallibility
Intrinsic
Phenomenology
Agentive
Phenomenal Character

Keywords

  • Agentive phenomenology
  • Introspective impotence
  • Introspective infallibility
  • Introspective reliability
  • Phenomenal beliefs
  • Phenomenal consciousness
  • Self-presenting beliefs

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

Introspection about Phenomenal Consciousness : Running the Gamut from Infallibility to Impotence. / Horgan, Terence E.

Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press, 2012.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

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