Jamming attack on in-band full-duplex communications

Detection and countermeasures

Manjesh K. Hanawal, Diep N. Nguyen, Marwan M Krunz

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Recent advances in the design of in-band full-duplex (IBFD) radios promise to double the throughput of a wireless link. However, IBFD-capable nodes are more vulnerable to jamming attacks than their out-of-band full-duplex (OBFD) counterparts, and any advantages offered by them over the OBFD nodes can be jeopardized by such attacks. A jammer needs to attack both the uplink and the downlink channels to completely break the communication link between two OBFD nodes. In contrast, he only needs to jam one channel (used for both uplink and downlink) in the case of two IBFD nodes. Even worse, a jammer with the IBFD capability can learn the transmitters' activity while injecting interference, allowing it to react instantly with the transmitter's strategies. In this paper, we investigate frequency hopping (FH) technique for countering jamming attacks in the context of IBFD wireless radios. Specifically, we develop an optimal strategy for IBFD radios to combat an IBFD reactive sweep jammer. First, we introduce two operational modes for IBFD radios: transmission reception and transmission-detection. These modes are intended to boost the anti-jamming capability of IBFD radios. We then jointly optimize the decision of when to switch between the modes and when to hop to a new channel using Markov decision processes. Numerical investigations show that our policy significantly improves the throughput of IBFD nodes under jamming attacks.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationIEEE INFOCOM 2016 - 35th Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Volume2016-July
ISBN (Electronic)9781467399531
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 27 2016
Event35th Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2016 - San Francisco, United States
Duration: Apr 10 2016Apr 14 2016

Other

Other35th Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2016
CountryUnited States
CitySan Francisco
Period4/10/164/14/16

Fingerprint

Radio receivers
Jamming
Communication
Telecommunication links
Transmitters
Throughput
Frequency hopping
Radio transmission
Switches

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Hanawal, M. K., Nguyen, D. N., & Krunz, M. M. (2016). Jamming attack on in-band full-duplex communications: Detection and countermeasures. In IEEE INFOCOM 2016 - 35th Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (Vol. 2016-July). [7524449] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/INFOCOM.2016.7524449

Jamming attack on in-band full-duplex communications : Detection and countermeasures. / Hanawal, Manjesh K.; Nguyen, Diep N.; Krunz, Marwan M.

IEEE INFOCOM 2016 - 35th Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications. Vol. 2016-July Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016. 7524449.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Hanawal, MK, Nguyen, DN & Krunz, MM 2016, Jamming attack on in-band full-duplex communications: Detection and countermeasures. in IEEE INFOCOM 2016 - 35th Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications. vol. 2016-July, 7524449, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 35th Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2016, San Francisco, United States, 4/10/16. https://doi.org/10.1109/INFOCOM.2016.7524449
Hanawal MK, Nguyen DN, Krunz MM. Jamming attack on in-band full-duplex communications: Detection and countermeasures. In IEEE INFOCOM 2016 - 35th Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications. Vol. 2016-July. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2016. 7524449 https://doi.org/10.1109/INFOCOM.2016.7524449
Hanawal, Manjesh K. ; Nguyen, Diep N. ; Krunz, Marwan M. / Jamming attack on in-band full-duplex communications : Detection and countermeasures. IEEE INFOCOM 2016 - 35th Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications. Vol. 2016-July Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016.
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