John martin fischer's the metaphysics of free will: An Essay on Control

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

John Martin Fischer's The Metaphysics of Free Will is devoted to two major projects. First, Fischer defends the thesis that determinism is incompatible with a person's control over alternatives to the actual future. Second, Fischer defends the striking thesis that such control is not necessary for moral responsibility. This review essay examines Fischer's arguments for each thesis. Fischer's defense of the incompatibilist thesis is the most innovative to date, and I argue that his formulation restructures the free will debate. To defend his second thesis Fischer relies upon examples designed to show that an agent is responsible for an unavoidable action. I criticize Fischer's account of these examples, but I also maintain that my criticisms do not compromise his theory of responsibility. I raise several other difficulties for Fischer's theory of responsibility, and I close by offering some suggestions about how he might further defend it.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)379-397
Number of pages19
JournalLegal Theory
Volume3
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - 1997
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

freedom of will
metaphysics
responsibility
determinism
compromise
criticism
human being
John Martin Fischer
Metaphysics
Free Will
Responsibility
Incompatibilist
Determinism
Criticism
Person
Compromise
Moral Responsibility

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Law

Cite this

John martin fischer's the metaphysics of free will : An Essay on Control. / McKenna, Michael S.

In: Legal Theory, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1997, p. 379-397.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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