Just the imagination: Why imagining doesn't behave like believing

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

42 Scopus citations

Abstract

According to recent accounts of the imagination, mental mechanisms that can take input from both imagining and from believing will process imagination-based inputs (pretense representations) and isomorphic beliefs in much the same way. That is, such a mechanism should produce similar outputs whether its input is the belief that p or the pretense representation that p. Unfortunately, there seem to be clear counter-examples to this hypothesis, for in many cases, imagining that p and believing that p have quite different psychological consequences. This paper sets out some central problem cases and argues that the cases might be accommodated by adverting to the role of desires concerning real and imaginary situations.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)459-474
Number of pages16
JournalMind and Language
Volume21
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 1 2006

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Language and Linguistics
  • Philosophy
  • Linguistics and Language

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Just the imagination: Why imagining doesn't behave like believing'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this