Justification, truth, and coherence

Keith Lehrer, Stewart M Cohen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

102 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A central issue in epistemology concerns the connection between truth and justification. The burden of our paper is to explain this connection. Reliabilism, defended by Goldman, assumes that the connection is one of reliability. We argue that this assumption is too strong. We argue that foundational theories, such as those articulated by Pollock and Chisholm fail to elucidate the connection. We consider the potentiality of coherence theories to explain the truth connection by means of higher level convictions about probabilities, which we call doxastic ascent, and defend such a theory. Our defense appeals to the work of Reid and contemporary cognitive psychology in order to account for the psychological reality of higher level evaluations.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)191-207
Number of pages17
JournalSynthese
Volume55
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1983

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epistemology
appeal
psychology
evaluation
coherence
Justification
Reliabilism
Burden
Psychological Reality
Conviction
Epistemology
Evaluation
Potentiality
Cognitive Psychology

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences(all)

Cite this

Justification, truth, and coherence. / Lehrer, Keith; Cohen, Stewart M.

In: Synthese, Vol. 55, No. 2, 05.1983, p. 191-207.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Lehrer, Keith ; Cohen, Stewart M. / Justification, truth, and coherence. In: Synthese. 1983 ; Vol. 55, No. 2. pp. 191-207.
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