Lawyers and fools: Lawyer-directors in public corporations

Lubomir P Litov, Simone Maria Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The accepted wisdom-that a lawyer who becomes a corporate director has a fool for a client-is outdated. The benefits of lawyer-directors in today's world significantly outweigh the costs. Beyond monitoring, they help manage litigation and regulation, as well as structure compensation to align CEO and shareholder interests. The results have been an average 9.5% increase in firm value and an almost doubling in the percentage of public companies with lawyer-directors. This Article is the first to analyze the rise of lawyer-directors. It makes a variety of other empirical contributions, each of which is statistically significant and large in magnitude. First, it explains why the number of lawyer-directors has increased. Among other reasons, businesses subject to greater litigation and regulation as well as firms with significant intangible assets, such as patents, value a lawyer-director's expertise. Second, this Article describes the impact of lawyer-directors on corporate monitoring. Among other results, it shows that lawyer-directors are more likely to favor a board structure and takeover defenses that potentially reduce shareholder value-balanced, however, by the benefits of lawyer-directors, such as the valuable advice they can provide. Finally, this Article analyzes the significant reduction in risk-taking and the increase in firm value that results from having a lawyer on the board. Our findings fly in the face of requirements that focus on director independence. Our results show that board composition-and the training, skills, and experience that directors bring to managing a business-can be at least as valuable to the firm and its shareholders.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)413-480
Number of pages68
JournalGeorgetown Law Journal
Volume102
Issue number2
StatePublished - 2014

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lawyer
director
corporation
firm
shareholder
monitoring
shareholder value
regulation
Values
patent
wisdom
assets
expertise

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Law

Cite this

Lawyers and fools : Lawyer-directors in public corporations. / Litov, Lubomir P; Sepe, Simone Maria; Whitehead, Charles K.

In: Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 102, No. 2, 2014, p. 413-480.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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