Learning and communication in sender-receiver games

An econometric investigation

Andreas - Blume, Douglas V. Dejong, George R. Neumann, N. E. Savin

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper compares stimulus response (SR) and belief-based learning (BBL) using data from experiments with sender-receiver games. The environment, extensive form games played in a population setting, is novel in the empirical literature on learning in games. Both the SR and BBL models fit the data reasonably well in games where the preferences of senders and receivers are perfectly aligned and where the population history of the senders is known. The test results accept SR and reject BBL in games without population history and in all but one of the games where senders and receivers have different preferences over equilibria. Estimation is challenging since the likelihood function is not globally concave and the data become uninformative about learning once equilibrium is achieved.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)225-247
Number of pages23
JournalJournal of Applied Econometrics
Volume17
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2002
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

econometrics
recipient
communication
stimulus
learning
history
Econometrics
Communication
experiment
Learning in games
Extensive form games
Experiment
Learning model

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

Cite this

Learning and communication in sender-receiver games : An econometric investigation. / Blume, Andreas -; Dejong, Douglas V.; Neumann, George R.; Savin, N. E.

In: Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 17, No. 3, 05.2002, p. 225-247.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Blume, Andreas - ; Dejong, Douglas V. ; Neumann, George R. ; Savin, N. E. / Learning and communication in sender-receiver games : An econometric investigation. In: Journal of Applied Econometrics. 2002 ; Vol. 17, No. 3. pp. 225-247.
@article{7b009ef2f3994aa082c32f0b711f667f,
title = "Learning and communication in sender-receiver games: An econometric investigation",
abstract = "This paper compares stimulus response (SR) and belief-based learning (BBL) using data from experiments with sender-receiver games. The environment, extensive form games played in a population setting, is novel in the empirical literature on learning in games. Both the SR and BBL models fit the data reasonably well in games where the preferences of senders and receivers are perfectly aligned and where the population history of the senders is known. The test results accept SR and reject BBL in games without population history and in all but one of the games where senders and receivers have different preferences over equilibria. Estimation is challenging since the likelihood function is not globally concave and the data become uninformative about learning once equilibrium is achieved.",
author = "Blume, {Andreas -} and Dejong, {Douglas V.} and Neumann, {George R.} and Savin, {N. E.}",
year = "2002",
month = "5",
doi = "10.1002/jae.647",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "17",
pages = "225--247",
journal = "Journal of Applied Econometrics",
issn = "0883-7252",
publisher = "John Wiley and Sons Ltd",
number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Learning and communication in sender-receiver games

T2 - An econometric investigation

AU - Blume, Andreas -

AU - Dejong, Douglas V.

AU - Neumann, George R.

AU - Savin, N. E.

PY - 2002/5

Y1 - 2002/5

N2 - This paper compares stimulus response (SR) and belief-based learning (BBL) using data from experiments with sender-receiver games. The environment, extensive form games played in a population setting, is novel in the empirical literature on learning in games. Both the SR and BBL models fit the data reasonably well in games where the preferences of senders and receivers are perfectly aligned and where the population history of the senders is known. The test results accept SR and reject BBL in games without population history and in all but one of the games where senders and receivers have different preferences over equilibria. Estimation is challenging since the likelihood function is not globally concave and the data become uninformative about learning once equilibrium is achieved.

AB - This paper compares stimulus response (SR) and belief-based learning (BBL) using data from experiments with sender-receiver games. The environment, extensive form games played in a population setting, is novel in the empirical literature on learning in games. Both the SR and BBL models fit the data reasonably well in games where the preferences of senders and receivers are perfectly aligned and where the population history of the senders is known. The test results accept SR and reject BBL in games without population history and in all but one of the games where senders and receivers have different preferences over equilibria. Estimation is challenging since the likelihood function is not globally concave and the data become uninformative about learning once equilibrium is achieved.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0036095779&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0036095779&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1002/jae.647

DO - 10.1002/jae.647

M3 - Article

VL - 17

SP - 225

EP - 247

JO - Journal of Applied Econometrics

JF - Journal of Applied Econometrics

SN - 0883-7252

IS - 3

ER -