Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games

Andreas - Blume, Tone Arnold

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study learning in communication games. Our main finding is that a simple forward-looking learning rule leads to communication in a large class of games. This class is characterized by a partial-common-interest condition. In contrast, we show that a variety of purely backward looking dynamics may fail to guarantee communication. Memory is a partial substitute for looking forward: With long memory, backward-looking learning leads to communication in a class of games with perfect incentive alignment.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)240-259
Number of pages20
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume46
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 2004
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Communication
Cheap talk
Incentive alignment
Guarantee
Long memory
Substitute

Keywords

  • Cheap talk
  • Communication
  • Evolution
  • Game theory
  • Incentive alignment
  • Information transmission
  • Language
  • Learning
  • Meaning

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

Cite this

Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games. / Blume, Andreas -; Arnold, Tone.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 46, No. 2, 02.2004, p. 240-259.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Blume, Andreas - ; Arnold, Tone. / Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2004 ; Vol. 46, No. 2. pp. 240-259.
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