Learning to play Cournot duopoly strategies

James C. Cox, Mark Walker

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

36 Scopus citations

Abstract

The paper reports results from experiments designed to determine whether subjects can learn to play Cournot duopoly strategies and whether their out-of-equilibrium play is consistent with the predictions of learning models. The experiments include duopolies with constant and with decreasing marginal costs, and with theoretically stable and unstable equilibria. After a few periods, subjects do play stable interior equilibria but they do not play stable boundary equilibria nor unstable interior equilibria. Subjects' out-of-equilibrium play is inconsistent with the predictions of the learning models.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)141-161
Number of pages21
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume36
Issue number2
StatePublished - Aug 1 1998

Keywords

  • C72
  • C92
  • D43
  • D83
  • Duopoly
  • Experiments
  • Learning

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

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