Legalizing Bribe Giving

Martin Dufwenberg, Giancarlo Spagnolo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A model of "harassment bribes," paid for services one is entitled to, is developed to analyze the proposal to legalize paying these bribes while increasing fines on accepting them. We explore performance as regards corruption deterrence and public service provision. Costs of verifying reports make the scheme more effective against larger bribes and where institutions' quality is higher. A modified scheme, where immunity is conditional on reporting, addresses some key objections. The mechanism works better against more distortionary forms of corruption than harassment bribes, provided monetary rewards can compensate bribers for losing the object of the corrupt exchange. Results highlight strong complementarities with policies aimed at improving independence and accountability of law enforcers. (JEL D73, K42, O17)

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)836-853
Number of pages18
JournalEconomic Inquiry
Volume53
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1 2015

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Bribes
Harassment
Corruption
Public services
Immunity
Reward
Accountability
Costs
Service provision
Deterrence
Complementarity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)

Cite this

Legalizing Bribe Giving. / Dufwenberg, Martin; Spagnolo, Giancarlo.

In: Economic Inquiry, Vol. 53, No. 2, 01.04.2015, p. 836-853.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Dufwenberg, Martin ; Spagnolo, Giancarlo. / Legalizing Bribe Giving. In: Economic Inquiry. 2015 ; Vol. 53, No. 2. pp. 836-853.
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