Lies in disguise – A theoretical analysis of cheating

Martin Dufwenberg, Martin A. Dufwenberg

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

23 Scopus citations

Abstract

We perform a (psychological) game-theoretic analysis of cheating in the setting proposed by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013). The key assumption, referred to as perceived cheating aversion, is that the decision maker derives disutility in proportion to the amount in which he is perceived to cheat. A particular equilibrium, characterized by three intuitive properties, captures the stylized facts from many experiments (in particular the co-presence of selfish, honest, and partial-lie choices) well.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)248-264
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume175
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2018

Keywords

  • Audience
  • Cheating
  • Costs
  • Lying
  • Perceived cheating aversion
  • Psychological game theory

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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