Managing decentralized inventory and transshipment

Nichalin Suakkaphong, Moshe Dror

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Any decentralized retail or wholesale system of competing entities requires a benefit sharing arrangement when competing entities collaborate after their demands are realized. For instance, consider a distribution system similar to the observed behavior of independent car dealerships. If a dealership does not have in stock the car requested by a customer, it might consider acquiring it from a competing dealer. Such behavior raises questions about procurement strategies that achieve system optimal (first-best) outcomes. In this paper, we examine the existence and uniqueness of pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) for a decentralized system that adopts a transfer payment approach proposed by Anupindi et al. (Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manag. 4(3):349-368, 2001). In particular, we state a set of conditions on cost parameters and distributions that guarantee uniqueness of PSNE and discuss its consequences. We also examine a situation with incomplete information and expand the scope of the earlier models by relaxing the assumption of satisfying local demand first. That is, we allow the retailers to transship their inventory regardless of the local demand status if such transshipment increases retailer's profit, and observe that this model extension does not affect our results relative to the more restrictive case. In short, our results provide important insights, clarifications, and strategic limitations regarding collaborations in decentralized distribution system.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)480-506
Number of pages27
JournalTOP
Volume19
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2011

Fingerprint

Decentralized
Railroad cars
Distribution System
Nash Equilibrium
Optimal systems
Profitability
Optimal System
Incomplete Information
Expand
Profit
Arrangement
Sharing
Existence and Uniqueness
Uniqueness
Customers
Costs
Model
Strategy
Transshipment
Demand

Keywords

  • Cooperation and competition
  • Inventory games
  • Nash equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Discrete Mathematics and Combinatorics

Cite this

Managing decentralized inventory and transshipment. / Suakkaphong, Nichalin; Dror, Moshe.

In: TOP, Vol. 19, No. 2, 12.2011, p. 480-506.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Suakkaphong, Nichalin ; Dror, Moshe. / Managing decentralized inventory and transshipment. In: TOP. 2011 ; Vol. 19, No. 2. pp. 480-506.
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