Mental Causation

Cei Maslen, Terence E Horgan, Helen Daly

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

Mental causation is held so dear because it seems essential in order for people to do anything (at least voluntarily). If one accepts Davidson's view that motivating reasons are causes, then (as Kim puts it) 'agency is possible only if mental causation is possible'. Many kinds of mental items are supposed to be causes: beliefs, desires, sensations, emotions, the contents of beliefs and desires, and the phenomenal mental properties of sensations and beliefs (i.e. those properties such that there is 'something it is like' to experience them, if sensations and beliefs have such properties). Not only are mental states supposed to be causes (and effects), but so also are mental properties.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationThe Oxford Handbook of Causation
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Print)9780191577246, 9780199279739
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2 2010

    Fingerprint

Keywords

  • Contents of beliefs
  • Emotions
  • Mental causation
  • Mental properties
  • Mental states
  • Sensations

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

Maslen, C., Horgan, T. E., & Daly, H. (2010). Mental Causation. In The Oxford Handbook of Causation Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279739.003.0025