Mental causation and the agent-exclusion problem

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The hypothesis of the mental state-causation of behavior (the MSC hypothesis) asserts that the behaviors we classify as actions are caused by certain mental states. A principal reason often given for trying to secure the truth of the MSC hypothesis is that doing so is allegedly required to vindicate our belief in our own agency. I argue that the project of vindicating agency needs to be seriously reconceived, as does the relation between this project and the MSC hypothesis. Vindication requires addressing what I call the agent-exclusion problem: the prima facie incompatibility between the intentional content of agentive experience and certain metaphysical hypotheses often espoused in philosophy-metaphysical hypotheses like physical causal closure, determinism, and the MSC hypothesis itself. I describe several radically different approaches to the vindication project, one of which would repudiate the MSC hypothesis and embrace metaphysical libertarianism about freedom and determinism. I sketch the position I myself favor-a specific version of the generic approach asserting that the intentional content of agentive experience is compatible with the MSC hypothesis (and with physical causal closure, and with determinism). I describe how my favored approach can plausibly explain the temptation to embrace incompatibilism concerning the agent-exclusion problem.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)183-200
Number of pages18
JournalErkenntnis
Volume67
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2007

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Causation
Determinism
Closure
Mental Causation
Metaphysical
Exclusion
Agentive
Vindication
Mental State
Physical
Causal
Intentional Content
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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Logic

Cite this

Mental causation and the agent-exclusion problem. / Horgan, Terence E.

In: Erkenntnis, Vol. 67, No. 2, 09.2007, p. 183-200.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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