Meta-Skepticism

Meditations in Ethno-Epistemology

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Throughout the twentieth century, an enormous amount of intellectual fuel was spent debating the merits of a class of skeptical arguments which purport to show that knowledge of the external world is not possible. These arguments played an important role in the work of some of the leading philosophers of the twentieth century, including Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein. Typically, these arguments make use of one or more of the premises which the philosophers proposing them take to be intuitively obvious. Beyond an appeal to intuition, little or no defense is offered, and in many cases it is hard to see what else could be said in support of these premises. A number of authors have suggested that the intuitions undergirding these skeptical arguments are universal-shared by everyone (or almost everyone) who thinks reflectively about knowledge. This chapter offers some evidence indicating that they are far from universal. Rather, the evidence suggests that many of the intuitions epistemologists invoke vary with the cultural background, socio-economic status, and educational background of the person offering the intuition. And this is bad news for the skeptical arguments that rely on those intuitions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationCollected Papers, Volume 2: Knowledge, Rationality, and Morality, 1978-2010
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Print)9780199949823, 9780199733477
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 20 2012
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Intuition
Skepticism
Epistemology
Meditation
Skeptical Arguments
Philosopher
Socioeconomic Status
Debating
External World
Epistemologists
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Education
Merit
Cultural Background
Bad News
Person

Keywords

  • Epistemologists
  • External world
  • Intuitions
  • Knowledge

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

Nichols, S. B., Stich, S., & Weinberg, J. M. (2012). Meta-Skepticism: Meditations in Ethno-Epistemology. In Collected Papers, Volume 2: Knowledge, Rationality, and Morality, 1978-2010 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199733477.003.0010

Meta-Skepticism : Meditations in Ethno-Epistemology. / Nichols, Shaun B; Stich, Stephen; Weinberg, Jonathan M.

Collected Papers, Volume 2: Knowledge, Rationality, and Morality, 1978-2010. Oxford University Press, 2012.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Nichols, SB, Stich, S & Weinberg, JM 2012, Meta-Skepticism: Meditations in Ethno-Epistemology. in Collected Papers, Volume 2: Knowledge, Rationality, and Morality, 1978-2010. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199733477.003.0010
Nichols SB, Stich S, Weinberg JM. Meta-Skepticism: Meditations in Ethno-Epistemology. In Collected Papers, Volume 2: Knowledge, Rationality, and Morality, 1978-2010. Oxford University Press. 2012 https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199733477.003.0010
Nichols, Shaun B ; Stich, Stephen ; Weinberg, Jonathan M. / Meta-Skepticism : Meditations in Ethno-Epistemology. Collected Papers, Volume 2: Knowledge, Rationality, and Morality, 1978-2010. Oxford University Press, 2012.
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