Abstract
In How Should Ethics Relate to (the rest of) Philosophy?, Stephen Darwall challenges both the claims of independence and priority. He argues that although metaethics and normative ethics are properly focused on different issues, they need to be brought into a dynamic relation with one another in order to produce a systematic and defensible philosophical ethics. Their mutual dependence, claims Darwall, is owing to the fact that issues of normativity are at the centre of the concerns of both metaethics and normative ethics. In making his case, Darwall examines Moore's doctrine that an irreducible notion of intrinsic value is fundamental in ethics, and argues that although Moore was correct in thinking that ethical notions are irreducible, he was incorrect in thinking that this is because they have a notion of intrinsic value at their core. Rather, according to Darwall, the notion of a normative reason is ethically fundamental, and a proper philosophical ethics that fully accommodates the normativity involved in ethical thought and discourse will require that metaethical issues and normative issues bearing on normativity be 'pursued interdependently as complementary aspects of a comprehensive philosophical ethics'. He illustrates this claim by explaining how certain debates within normative ethics over consequentialism and over virtue depend upon metaethical issues about the nature of normativity.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Number of pages | 416 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780191710032, 0199269912, 9780199269914 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 26 2006 |
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Keywords
- Consequentialism
- Ethical thought
- Independence
- Intrinsic value
- Metaethics
- Moore
- Normative ethics
- Normativity
- Priority
- Virtue
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)
Cite this
Metaethics after Moore. / Horgan, Terence E; Timmons, Mark C.
Oxford University Press, 2006. 416 p.Research output: Book/Report › Book
}
TY - BOOK
T1 - Metaethics after Moore
AU - Horgan, Terence E
AU - Timmons, Mark C
PY - 2006/1/26
Y1 - 2006/1/26
N2 - In How Should Ethics Relate to (the rest of) Philosophy?, Stephen Darwall challenges both the claims of independence and priority. He argues that although metaethics and normative ethics are properly focused on different issues, they need to be brought into a dynamic relation with one another in order to produce a systematic and defensible philosophical ethics. Their mutual dependence, claims Darwall, is owing to the fact that issues of normativity are at the centre of the concerns of both metaethics and normative ethics. In making his case, Darwall examines Moore's doctrine that an irreducible notion of intrinsic value is fundamental in ethics, and argues that although Moore was correct in thinking that ethical notions are irreducible, he was incorrect in thinking that this is because they have a notion of intrinsic value at their core. Rather, according to Darwall, the notion of a normative reason is ethically fundamental, and a proper philosophical ethics that fully accommodates the normativity involved in ethical thought and discourse will require that metaethical issues and normative issues bearing on normativity be 'pursued interdependently as complementary aspects of a comprehensive philosophical ethics'. He illustrates this claim by explaining how certain debates within normative ethics over consequentialism and over virtue depend upon metaethical issues about the nature of normativity.
AB - In How Should Ethics Relate to (the rest of) Philosophy?, Stephen Darwall challenges both the claims of independence and priority. He argues that although metaethics and normative ethics are properly focused on different issues, they need to be brought into a dynamic relation with one another in order to produce a systematic and defensible philosophical ethics. Their mutual dependence, claims Darwall, is owing to the fact that issues of normativity are at the centre of the concerns of both metaethics and normative ethics. In making his case, Darwall examines Moore's doctrine that an irreducible notion of intrinsic value is fundamental in ethics, and argues that although Moore was correct in thinking that ethical notions are irreducible, he was incorrect in thinking that this is because they have a notion of intrinsic value at their core. Rather, according to Darwall, the notion of a normative reason is ethically fundamental, and a proper philosophical ethics that fully accommodates the normativity involved in ethical thought and discourse will require that metaethical issues and normative issues bearing on normativity be 'pursued interdependently as complementary aspects of a comprehensive philosophical ethics'. He illustrates this claim by explaining how certain debates within normative ethics over consequentialism and over virtue depend upon metaethical issues about the nature of normativity.
KW - Consequentialism
KW - Ethical thought
KW - Independence
KW - Intrinsic value
KW - Metaethics
KW - Moore
KW - Normative ethics
KW - Normativity
KW - Priority
KW - Virtue
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=63849283307&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=63849283307&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.001.0001
DO - 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.001.0001
M3 - Book
AN - SCOPUS:63849283307
SN - 9780191710032
SN - 0199269912
SN - 9780199269914
BT - Metaethics after Moore
PB - Oxford University Press
ER -