Mitigating control-channel jamming attacks in multi-channel ad hoc networks

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

90 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We address the problem of control-channel jamming attacks in multi-channel ad hoc networks. Deviating from the traditional view that sees jamming attacks as a physical-layer vulnerability, we consider a sophisticated adversary who exploits knowledge of the protocol mechanics along with cryptographic quantities extracted from compromised nodes to maximize the impact of his attack on higher-layer functions. We propose new security metrics that quantify the ability of the adversary to deny access to the control channel, and the overall delay incurred in re-establishing the control channel. We also propose a randomized distributed scheme that allows nodes to establish a new control channel using frequency hopping. Our method differs from classic frequency hopping in that no two nodes share the same hopping sequence, thus mitigating the impact of node compromise. Furthermore, a compromised node is uniquely identified through its hop sequence, leading to its isolation from any future information regarding the frequency location of the control channel.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security, WiSec'09
Pages169-180
Number of pages12
DOIs
StatePublished - 2009
Event2nd ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security, WiSec'09 - Zurich, Switzerland
Duration: Mar 16 2009Mar 18 2009

Other

Other2nd ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security, WiSec'09
CountrySwitzerland
CityZurich
Period3/16/093/18/09

Fingerprint

Jamming
Ad hoc networks
Frequency hopping
Mechanics
Network protocols

Keywords

  • Ad hoc networks
  • Control channel
  • Denial of service
  • Jamming
  • Multi channel

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Software

Cite this

Lazos, L., Liu, S., & Krunz, M. M. (2009). Mitigating control-channel jamming attacks in multi-channel ad hoc networks. In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security, WiSec'09 (pp. 169-180) https://doi.org/10.1145/1514274.1514299

Mitigating control-channel jamming attacks in multi-channel ad hoc networks. / Lazos, Loukas; Liu, Sisi; Krunz, Marwan M.

Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security, WiSec'09. 2009. p. 169-180.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Lazos, L, Liu, S & Krunz, MM 2009, Mitigating control-channel jamming attacks in multi-channel ad hoc networks. in Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security, WiSec'09. pp. 169-180, 2nd ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security, WiSec'09, Zurich, Switzerland, 3/16/09. https://doi.org/10.1145/1514274.1514299
Lazos L, Liu S, Krunz MM. Mitigating control-channel jamming attacks in multi-channel ad hoc networks. In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security, WiSec'09. 2009. p. 169-180 https://doi.org/10.1145/1514274.1514299
Lazos, Loukas ; Liu, Sisi ; Krunz, Marwan M. / Mitigating control-channel jamming attacks in multi-channel ad hoc networks. Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security, WiSec'09. 2009. pp. 169-180
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