Modeling common property ownership as a dynamic contract

M. R. Caputo, Dean L Lueck

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Common property ownership is modeled as a joint wealth maximizing egalitarian share contract. Two-stage differential games are developed for various types of common property in order to examine the incentives inherent in common property regimes. Cases in which group members contract over just membership size and cases in which members contract over both group size and resource investment are considered. Envelope methods in optimal control theory are used to generate some comparative statics predictions about the value of the contracts which define property rights to a capital stock. -Authors

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)225-245
Number of pages21
JournalNatural Resource Modeling
Volume8
Issue number3
StatePublished - 1994
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

common property resource
ownership
Modeling
modeling
Comparative Statics
Optimal Control Theory
Differential Games
property rights
group size
Incentives
Control theory
Envelope
incentive
Resources
contract
Prediction
resource
prediction

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Earth and Planetary Sciences(all)
  • Environmental Science(all)

Cite this

Modeling common property ownership as a dynamic contract. / Caputo, M. R.; Lueck, Dean L.

In: Natural Resource Modeling, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1994, p. 225-245.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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