Moral hazard in active asset management

David C. Brown, Shaun William Davies

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider a model of active asset management in which mutual fund managers exert unobservable effort to earn excess returns. Investors allocate capital to actively managed funds and passively managed products. In equilibrium, investors are indifferent between investing an additional dollar with an active manager or with a passively managed product. As passively managed products become more attractive to investors, active managers' revenues from portfolio-management services fall, reducing their effort incentives. More-severe decreasing-returns-to-scale are also associated with reduced incentives and increased moral hazard. Performance-based fees and holdings-based data are all unlikely to mitigate moral hazard.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalJournal of Financial Economics
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - Mar 9 2016

Fingerprint

Asset management
Investors
Moral hazard
Managers
Incentives
Fees
Revenue
Investing
Managed funds
Fund managers
Mutual funds
Excess returns
Portfolio management
Returns to scale

Keywords

  • Active management
  • Moral hazard
  • Mutual funds
  • Passive management

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Strategy and Management

Cite this

Moral hazard in active asset management. / Brown, David C.; Davies, Shaun William.

In: Journal of Financial Economics, 09.03.2016.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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