Moral pluralism in smith and his contemporaries

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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Abstract

What role do general principles play in our moral judgment? This question has been much contested among moral theorists of the last fifteen years. When we turn to the British moralists of the eighteenth century, we find that the same question was equally pressing. In this paper, I show that while many of the British moralists thought that general principles could conclusively determine our moral duties, David Hume and Adam Smith were ambivalent about the role of moral principles, not only giving expression to the common view of principles' power but also exploring the possibility that principles could not fill the justificatory space typically allotted them. Hume and Smith, I show, constitute fascinating transitional figures in our thinking about the role of general moral principles.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)275-306
Number of pages32
JournalRevue Internationale de Philosophie
Volume269
Issue number3
StatePublished - 2014

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Moral Pluralism
Moral Principles
Moralist
Theorists
Adam Smith
Moral Judgment
David Hume

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Moral pluralism in smith and his contemporaries. / Gill, Michael B.

In: Revue Internationale de Philosophie, Vol. 269, No. 3, 2014, p. 275-306.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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