Multi-period bargaining: Asymmetric information and risk aversion

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A two period bargaining model with asymmetric information is considered. An uninformed seller charges a uniform price to two buyers. A risk averse seller offers a larger price cut in period two when one buyer remains in the market than when two buyers remain. The price in period one is sensitive to the number of buyers and the seller's degree of risk aversion. The initial price charged to a single buyer may be higher or lower than the price charged to two buyers, depending on the degree of seller risk aversion.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)309-315
Number of pages7
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume72
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2001

Fingerprint

Buyers
Asymmetric information
Risk aversion
Seller
Bargaining model
Risk-averse
Charge
Uniform price

Keywords

  • Bargaining
  • C78
  • D82
  • Risk aversion

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

Cite this

Multi-period bargaining : Asymmetric information and risk aversion. / Reynolds, Stanley S.

In: Economics Letters, Vol. 72, No. 3, 09.2001, p. 309-315.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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