Renewable natural resources such as ground-water, pastures and fisheries are often governed bycommon propertyrights in which members of a group jointlyown the exclusive use of the resource. We develop a formal model of a common propertycontract based on differential game theory and then use the model to examine (i) the incentives of individual users of the common resource; (ii) the resulting harvest and stock time paths; (iii) the local stabilityof the steady state; and (iv) the steadystate comparative statics. Moreover, we compare the qualitative properties of the common propertyregime to those generated under perfectlydefined private rights and open access. We show how common prop-ertyownership of natural resources can generate rent and be a second-best solution when private propertyrights are costly to establish.
|Original language||English (US)|
|Number of pages||29|
|Journal||Natural Resource Modeling|
|State||Published - Jan 1 2003|
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Modeling and Simulation
- Environmental Science (miscellaneous)