Natural resource exploitation under common property rights

Michael R. Caputo, Dean L Lueck

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Renewable natural resources such as ground-water, pastures and fisheries are often governed bycommon propertyrights in which members of a group jointlyown the exclusive use of the resource. We develop a formal model of a common propertycontract based on differential game theory and then use the model to examine (i) the incentives of individual users of the common resource; (ii) the resulting harvest and stock time paths; (iii) the local stabilityof the steady state; and (iv) the steadystate comparative statics. Moreover, we compare the qualitative properties of the common propertyregime to those generated under perfectlydefined private rights and open access. We show how common prop-ertyownership of natural resources can generate rent and be a second-best solution when private propertyrights are costly to establish.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)39-67
Number of pages29
JournalNatural Resource Modeling
Volume16
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2003
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

common property resource
Natural Resources
property rights
Natural resources
Exploitation
natural resource
Comparative Statics
Renewable Resources
game theory
Fisheries
Resources
Qualitative Properties
Game theory
Ground Water
renewable resource
Differential Games
resource
Formal Model
Game Theory
Incentives

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Environmental Science (miscellaneous)

Cite this

Natural resource exploitation under common property rights. / Caputo, Michael R.; Lueck, Dean L.

In: Natural Resource Modeling, Vol. 16, No. 1, 01.01.2003, p. 39-67.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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