Neighborhood stability in sender-receiver games

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper characterizes robust outcomes in sender-receiver games. An equilibrium (a retract) is perturbed message persistent (PMP) if it is the limit (Hausdorff limit) of persistent equilibria(persistent retracts) in perturbed games. In strict common interestgames separating equilibria are PMP and message invariant equilibria are not PMP. With partial common interest, there exists a PMP retract which partially separates types and message invariant equilibria are not PMP. Under a rich language condition only partially separating equilibria are PMP in partial common interest games, and there are further results on refinements and games where the sender has a preferred equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)2-25
Number of pages24
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume13
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1996
Externally publishedYes

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Separating equilibrium
Language
Economics

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

Cite this

Neighborhood stability in sender-receiver games. / Blume, Andreas -.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 13, No. 1, 03.1996, p. 2-25.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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