Non-cooperative and cooperative game-theoretic models for usage-based lease contracts

Maryam Hamidi, Haitao Liao, Ferenc Szidarovszky

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

17 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we study game-theoretic models for lease contracts, by which the owner (lessor) rents a piece of equipment to a user (lessee). The lessee decides on the optimal lease period and usage rate, and the lessor is responsible for developing a maintenance policy for the equipment. Two non-cooperative game-theoretic models and a cooperative model are developed to describe the relationships between the two decision makers. In the non-cooperative simultaneous move game, the lessee and the lessor act simultaneously and independently to make their decisions. In the leader-follower non-cooperative game, the lessor is the leader who specifies the maintenance policy first, and the lessee, as the follower, decides on the lease period and usage rate accordingly. For these two games, the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are obtained respectively. For the cooperative game, we derive the solution targeting on total profit maximization and show that this solution can be implemented as an equilibrium using a nonlinear transfer-payment contract. Besides, we compare the Nash equilibrium, Stackelberg equilibrium, and the total maximum solution to each other, and our results show that the lessee and lessor can gain more profit from the cooperative contract than from the non-cooperative alternatives. Numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the different solution methodologies and the value of cooperation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - Apr 16 2015
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Cooperative Game
Stackelberg Equilibrium
Maintenance Policy
Non-cooperative Game
Game
Nash Equilibrium
Profit
Profitability
Model
Numerical Examples
Methodology
Alternatives
Demonstrate
Game-theoretic models
Lease
Cooperative game
Stackelberg equilibrium
Non-cooperative game
Nash equilibrium
Follower

Keywords

  • Coordination mechanism
  • Game theory
  • Lease contracts
  • Maintenance
  • Usage rate

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Information Systems and Management

Cite this

Non-cooperative and cooperative game-theoretic models for usage-based lease contracts. / Hamidi, Maryam; Liao, Haitao; Szidarovszky, Ferenc.

In: European Journal of Operational Research, 16.04.2015.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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