Nonconciliation in Peer Disagreement: Its Phenomenology and Its Rationality

David Henderson, Terence E Horgan, Matjaž Potrč, Hannah Tierney

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

The authors argue in favor of the "nonconciliation" (or "steadfast") position concerning the problem of peer disagreement. Throughout the paper they place heavy emphasis on matters of phenomenology-on how things seem epistemically with respect to the net import of one's available evidence vis-à-vis the disputed claim p, and on how such phenomenology is affected by the awareness that an interlocutor whom one initially regards as an epistemic peer disagrees with oneself about p. Central to the argument is a nested goal/sub-goal hierarchy that the authors claim is inherent to the structure of epistemically responsible belief-formation: Pursuing true beliefs by pursuing beliefs that are objectively likely given one's total available evidence; pursuing this sub-goal by pursuing beliefs that are likely true (given that evidence) relative to one's own deep epistemic sensibility; and pursuing this sub-sub-goal by forming beliefs in accordance with one's own all-in, ultima facie, epistemic seemings.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)194-225
Number of pages32
JournalGrazer Philosophische Studien
Volume94
Issue number1-2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2017

Keywords

  • epistemic seemings
  • nonconciliation
  • Peer disagreement
  • rationality
  • steadfastness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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