Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

This chapter argues for two claims. The first is that a sizeable group of epistemological projects-a group which includes much of what has been done in epistemology in the analytic tradition-would be seriously undermined if one or more of a cluster of empirical hypotheses about epistemic intuitions turns out to be true. The basis for this claim is set out in Section 2. The second claim is that, while the jury is still out, there is now a substantial body of evidence suggesting that some of those empirical hypotheses are true. Much of this evidence derives from an ongoing series of experimental studies of epistemic intuitions. A preliminary report on these studies is presented in Section 3. In light of these studies, it is incumbent on those who pursue the epistemological projects in question to either explain why the truth of the hypotheses does not undermine their projects, or to say why, in light of the evidence presented, they nonetheless assume that the hypotheses are false. Section 4, which is devoted to Objections and Replies, considers some of the ways in which defenders of the projects being criticized might reply to the challenge.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationCollected Papers, Volume 2
Subtitle of host publicationKnowledge, Rationality, and Morality, 1978-2010
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Electronic)9780199949823
ISBN (Print)9780199733477
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 20 2012
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Empirical hypothesis
  • Epistemic intuitions
  • Epistemological projects
  • Epistemology

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

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  • Cite this

    Weinberg, J. M., Nichols, S., & Stich, S. (2012). Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions. In Collected Papers, Volume 2: Knowledge, Rationality, and Morality, 1978-2010 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199733477.003.0008