Normativity and the planning theory of law

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

In this essay, I focus on what appear to be Shapiro’s views about the normativity of law, as well as with his surprising claim that law necessarily has a moral aim. I argue that even if Shapiro offers a more compelling reply to the problem of the normativity of law than Hart offers in The Concept of Law, the moves that he makes appear to be equally available to a defender of Hart’s theory, and so in this respect, the planning theory has no particular advantage over the practice theory. As for the Moral Aim Thesis, it appears to be in tension with Shapiro’s positivism. If he is right that law has a moral aim and law claims moral legitimacy, then he should embrace a richer account of the nature and normativity of law than the one that he has offered.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)307-324
Number of pages18
JournalJurisprudence
Volume7
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 2016

Keywords

  • Fuller
  • Hume’s challenge
  • Moral aim
  • Moral legitimacy
  • Normativity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Law

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