On dissing public reason

A reply to Enoch

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This essay responds to David Enoch’s “The Disorder of Public Reason,” published in a previous issue of Ethics. I seek to set the record straight on several of the many charges Enoch makes. More importantly, having clarified some of the more basic points, I make some preliminary efforts at identifying when his brand of moral realism and my version of public reason differ—and, perhaps, where they are more compatible than one might think.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1078-1095
Number of pages18
JournalEthics
Volume125
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 14 2015

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Public Reason
Moral Realism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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On dissing public reason : A reply to Enoch. / Gaus, Gerald F.

In: Ethics, Vol. 125, No. 4, 14.07.2015, p. 1078-1095.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Gaus, Gerald F. / On dissing public reason : A reply to Enoch. In: Ethics. 2015 ; Vol. 125, No. 4. pp. 1078-1095.
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