On seeking the truth (whatever that is) through democracy

Estlund's case for the qualified epistemic claim

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In Democratic Authority David Estlund advances what I call the "Qualified Epistemic Claim," according to which democracy is the best epistemic strategy for revealing the truth from among those strategies that are generally acceptable. I examine this claim, focusing on three issues: the scope of truth claims for which it applies, the test by which we know whether democracy is best, and the mechanism by which democracy has this supposed benefit. I conclude that although Estlund has presented some suggestive considerations in favor of the Qualified Epistemic Claim, he does not present a convincing case for it.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)270-300
Number of pages31
JournalEthics
Volume121
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2011
Externally publishedYes

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Democracy
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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

On seeking the truth (whatever that is) through democracy : Estlund's case for the qualified epistemic claim. / Gaus, Gerald F.

In: Ethics, Vol. 121, No. 2, 01.2011, p. 270-300.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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