On the nonexistence of a dominant strategy mechanism for making optimal public decisions.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

78 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In a broad class of situations not covered by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem it is shown that one cannot design a strategy-proof choice mechanism which attains Pareto optimal outcomes. The results are shown to be generic in character - ie. any non-manipulable mechanism will attain nonoptimal outcomes virtually everywhere - and they cover, in particular, certain problems of allocating public and private goods. The analysis carried out in transferable utility environments, and makes extensive use of the mechanisms recently introduced by Groves.- Author

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1521-1540
Number of pages20
JournalEconometrica
Volume48
Issue number6
StatePublished - 1980
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Nonexistence
Cover
Theorem
Strategy
Dominant strategy
Design
Character
Class
Strategy-proof
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
Transferable utility

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

Cite this

On the nonexistence of a dominant strategy mechanism for making optimal public decisions. / Walker, Mark A.

In: Econometrica, Vol. 48, No. 6, 1980, p. 1521-1540.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{673bb7edf7c04e46991bc5f642190213,
title = "On the nonexistence of a dominant strategy mechanism for making optimal public decisions.",
abstract = "In a broad class of situations not covered by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem it is shown that one cannot design a strategy-proof choice mechanism which attains Pareto optimal outcomes. The results are shown to be generic in character - ie. any non-manipulable mechanism will attain nonoptimal outcomes virtually everywhere - and they cover, in particular, certain problems of allocating public and private goods. The analysis carried out in transferable utility environments, and makes extensive use of the mechanisms recently introduced by Groves.- Author",
author = "Walker, {Mark A}",
year = "1980",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "48",
pages = "1521--1540",
journal = "Econometrica",
issn = "0012-9682",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "6",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - On the nonexistence of a dominant strategy mechanism for making optimal public decisions.

AU - Walker, Mark A

PY - 1980

Y1 - 1980

N2 - In a broad class of situations not covered by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem it is shown that one cannot design a strategy-proof choice mechanism which attains Pareto optimal outcomes. The results are shown to be generic in character - ie. any non-manipulable mechanism will attain nonoptimal outcomes virtually everywhere - and they cover, in particular, certain problems of allocating public and private goods. The analysis carried out in transferable utility environments, and makes extensive use of the mechanisms recently introduced by Groves.- Author

AB - In a broad class of situations not covered by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem it is shown that one cannot design a strategy-proof choice mechanism which attains Pareto optimal outcomes. The results are shown to be generic in character - ie. any non-manipulable mechanism will attain nonoptimal outcomes virtually everywhere - and they cover, in particular, certain problems of allocating public and private goods. The analysis carried out in transferable utility environments, and makes extensive use of the mechanisms recently introduced by Groves.- Author

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0019147638&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0019147638&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0019147638

VL - 48

SP - 1521

EP - 1540

JO - Econometrica

JF - Econometrica

SN - 0012-9682

IS - 6

ER -