Optimizing centralized inventory operations in a cooperative game theory setting

Bruce C. Hartman, Moshe Dror

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

29 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

For single period inventory models with normally distributed, correlated individual demands we examine the problem of minimizing the cost of inventory centralization as a function of the covariance matrix. In a stable centralized setting there are no incentives for any party to break-away - referred to as nonempty core conditions. For the allocated benefits in inventory centralization, nonempty core conditions are always satisfied. In this paper we discuss a step by step greedy optimization procedure which computes an optimal centralization solution. The procedure manipulates the correlations without changing the mean or the variance at each store. We do not just accept that in the centralized setting the parties are better-off, but for the first time provide the analysis of how to maximize their collective benefits.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)243-257
Number of pages15
JournalIIE Transactions (Institute of Industrial Engineers)
Volume35
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2003

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Game theory
Covariance matrix
Costs
Centralization
Cooperative game theory

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering

Cite this

Optimizing centralized inventory operations in a cooperative game theory setting. / Hartman, Bruce C.; Dror, Moshe.

In: IIE Transactions (Institute of Industrial Engineers), Vol. 35, No. 3, 03.2003, p. 243-257.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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