Participation

Gary Charness, Martin Dufwenberg

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

57 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We show experimentally that whether and how communication achieves beneficial social outcomes in a hidden-information context depends crucially on whether low-talent agents can participate in a Pareto-improving outcome. Communication is effective (and patterns of lies and truth quite systematic) when this is feasible, but otherwise completely ineffective. We examine the data in light of two potentially relevant behavioral models: cost-of-lying and guilt-fromblame.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1211-1237
Number of pages27
JournalAmerican Economic Review
Volume101
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 2011

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Participation
Communication
Pareto
Costs
Hidden information
Behavioral model
Guilt

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Participation. / Charness, Gary; Dufwenberg, Martin.

In: American Economic Review, Vol. 101, No. 4, 06.2011, p. 1211-1237.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Charness, Gary ; Dufwenberg, Martin. / Participation. In: American Economic Review. 2011 ; Vol. 101, No. 4. pp. 1211-1237.
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