Perceptual reasons

Juan M Comesana, Matthew McGrath

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The two main theories of perceptual reasons in contemporary epistemology can be called Phenomenalism and Factualism. According to Phenomenalism, perceptual reasons are facts about experiences conceived of as phenomenal states, i.e., states individuated by phenomenal character, by what it’s like to be in them. According to Factualism, perceptual reasons are instead facts about the external objects perceived. The main problem with Factualism is that it struggles with bad cases: cases where perceived objects are not what they appear (illusions, broadly speaking) or where there is no perceived object at all (hallucinations). The main problem with Phenomenalism is that it struggles with good cases: cases where everything is perfectly normal and the external object is correctly perceived, so that one’s perceptual beliefs are knowledge. In this paper we show that there is a theory of perceptual reasons that avoids the problems for Factualism and Phenomenalism. We call this view Propositionalism. We use ‘proposition’ broadly to mean the entities that are contents of beliefs and other doxastic attitudes. The key to finding a middle ground between Phenomenalism and Factualism, we claim, is to allow our reasons to be false in bad cases. Despite being false, they are about the external world, not our phenomenal states.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)991-1006
Number of pages16
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume173
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1 2016

Fingerprint

Phenomenalism
Factualism
Epistemology
External World
Middle Ground
Illusion
Entity
Phenomenal Character
Hallucinations

Keywords

  • Factualism
  • Perceptual reasons
  • Phenomenalism
  • Propositionalism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Perceptual reasons. / Comesana, Juan M; McGrath, Matthew.

In: Philosophical Studies, Vol. 173, No. 4, 01.04.2016, p. 991-1006.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Comesana, Juan M ; McGrath, Matthew. / Perceptual reasons. In: Philosophical Studies. 2016 ; Vol. 173, No. 4. pp. 991-1006.
@article{4129f11a144843729bc35e714f6a9939,
title = "Perceptual reasons",
abstract = "The two main theories of perceptual reasons in contemporary epistemology can be called Phenomenalism and Factualism. According to Phenomenalism, perceptual reasons are facts about experiences conceived of as phenomenal states, i.e., states individuated by phenomenal character, by what it’s like to be in them. According to Factualism, perceptual reasons are instead facts about the external objects perceived. The main problem with Factualism is that it struggles with bad cases: cases where perceived objects are not what they appear (illusions, broadly speaking) or where there is no perceived object at all (hallucinations). The main problem with Phenomenalism is that it struggles with good cases: cases where everything is perfectly normal and the external object is correctly perceived, so that one’s perceptual beliefs are knowledge. In this paper we show that there is a theory of perceptual reasons that avoids the problems for Factualism and Phenomenalism. We call this view Propositionalism. We use ‘proposition’ broadly to mean the entities that are contents of beliefs and other doxastic attitudes. The key to finding a middle ground between Phenomenalism and Factualism, we claim, is to allow our reasons to be false in bad cases. Despite being false, they are about the external world, not our phenomenal states.",
keywords = "Factualism, Perceptual reasons, Phenomenalism, Propositionalism",
author = "Comesana, {Juan M} and Matthew McGrath",
year = "2016",
month = "4",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/s11098-015-0542-x",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "173",
pages = "991--1006",
journal = "Philosophical Studies",
issn = "0031-8116",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Perceptual reasons

AU - Comesana, Juan M

AU - McGrath, Matthew

PY - 2016/4/1

Y1 - 2016/4/1

N2 - The two main theories of perceptual reasons in contemporary epistemology can be called Phenomenalism and Factualism. According to Phenomenalism, perceptual reasons are facts about experiences conceived of as phenomenal states, i.e., states individuated by phenomenal character, by what it’s like to be in them. According to Factualism, perceptual reasons are instead facts about the external objects perceived. The main problem with Factualism is that it struggles with bad cases: cases where perceived objects are not what they appear (illusions, broadly speaking) or where there is no perceived object at all (hallucinations). The main problem with Phenomenalism is that it struggles with good cases: cases where everything is perfectly normal and the external object is correctly perceived, so that one’s perceptual beliefs are knowledge. In this paper we show that there is a theory of perceptual reasons that avoids the problems for Factualism and Phenomenalism. We call this view Propositionalism. We use ‘proposition’ broadly to mean the entities that are contents of beliefs and other doxastic attitudes. The key to finding a middle ground between Phenomenalism and Factualism, we claim, is to allow our reasons to be false in bad cases. Despite being false, they are about the external world, not our phenomenal states.

AB - The two main theories of perceptual reasons in contemporary epistemology can be called Phenomenalism and Factualism. According to Phenomenalism, perceptual reasons are facts about experiences conceived of as phenomenal states, i.e., states individuated by phenomenal character, by what it’s like to be in them. According to Factualism, perceptual reasons are instead facts about the external objects perceived. The main problem with Factualism is that it struggles with bad cases: cases where perceived objects are not what they appear (illusions, broadly speaking) or where there is no perceived object at all (hallucinations). The main problem with Phenomenalism is that it struggles with good cases: cases where everything is perfectly normal and the external object is correctly perceived, so that one’s perceptual beliefs are knowledge. In this paper we show that there is a theory of perceptual reasons that avoids the problems for Factualism and Phenomenalism. We call this view Propositionalism. We use ‘proposition’ broadly to mean the entities that are contents of beliefs and other doxastic attitudes. The key to finding a middle ground between Phenomenalism and Factualism, we claim, is to allow our reasons to be false in bad cases. Despite being false, they are about the external world, not our phenomenal states.

KW - Factualism

KW - Perceptual reasons

KW - Phenomenalism

KW - Propositionalism

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84961187521&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84961187521&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s11098-015-0542-x

DO - 10.1007/s11098-015-0542-x

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84961187521

VL - 173

SP - 991

EP - 1006

JO - Philosophical Studies

JF - Philosophical Studies

SN - 0031-8116

IS - 4

ER -