Phenomenal intentionality and content determinacy

Terence E Horgan, George Graham

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

21 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In his 1987 paper "Indeterminacy, Empiricism, and the First Person," John Searle argued that the first-person perspective provides the basis for securing determinacy in language and in thought, thereby fending off arguments for radical content-indeterminacy like those propounded by philosophers like Quine and Davidson. In this paper we propose a way of elaborating Searle's suggestive but cryptic remarks, within a framework that embraces the idea that the phenomenal character of experience is richly suffused with inherent, content-determinate, intentionality.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProspects for Meaning
PublisherWalter de Gruyter GmbH and Co. KG
Pages321-344
Number of pages24
ISBN (Print)9783110196238
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 30 2012

Fingerprint

Intentionality
Indeterminacy
Empiricism
Language
Phenomenal Character
First-person Perspective
Thought
Philosopher
John Searle
First Person

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

Horgan, T. E., & Graham, G. (2012). Phenomenal intentionality and content determinacy. In Prospects for Meaning (pp. 321-344). Walter de Gruyter GmbH and Co. KG. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110216882

Phenomenal intentionality and content determinacy. / Horgan, Terence E; Graham, George.

Prospects for Meaning. Walter de Gruyter GmbH and Co. KG, 2012. p. 321-344.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Horgan, TE & Graham, G 2012, Phenomenal intentionality and content determinacy. in Prospects for Meaning. Walter de Gruyter GmbH and Co. KG, pp. 321-344. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110216882
Horgan TE, Graham G. Phenomenal intentionality and content determinacy. In Prospects for Meaning. Walter de Gruyter GmbH and Co. KG. 2012. p. 321-344 https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110216882
Horgan, Terence E ; Graham, George. / Phenomenal intentionality and content determinacy. Prospects for Meaning. Walter de Gruyter GmbH and Co. KG, 2012. pp. 321-344
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