Phenomenal intentionality and content determinacy

Terry Horgan, George Graham

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

25 Scopus citations

Abstract

In his 1987 paper "Indeterminacy, Empiricism, and the First Person," John Searle argued that the first-person perspective provides the basis for securing determinacy in language and in thought, thereby fending off arguments for radical content-indeterminacy like those propounded by philosophers like Quine and Davidson. In this paper we propose a way of elaborating Searle's suggestive but cryptic remarks, within a framework that embraces the idea that the phenomenal character of experience is richly suffused with inherent, content-determinate, intentionality.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProspects for Meaning
PublisherWalter de Gruyter GmbH and Co. KG
Pages321-344
Number of pages24
ISBN (Print)9783110196238
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 30 2012

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

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    Horgan, T., & Graham, G. (2012). Phenomenal intentionality and content determinacy. In Prospects for Meaning (pp. 321-344). Walter de Gruyter GmbH and Co. KG. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110216882