Power Games for Secure Communications in Single-stream MIMO Interference Networks

Peyman Siyari, Marwan M Krunz, Diep Nguyen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We propose a distributed interference management method for a single-stream MIMO interference network that is tapped by an external eavesdropper. Along with its information signal, each legitimate transmitter creates a bogus signal, known as transmit-based friendly jamming (TxFJ), to confuse the eavesdropper. Although generating TxFJ protects the link from eavesdropping, it creates interference at other unintended but legitimate links. Using non-cooperative game theory, we design a distributed method for maximizing the sum of secrecy rates. Each link is a player in the game. It seeks to maximize its secrecy rate subject to a given information-rate constraint and power budget. The strategy profile of each player is to control the amount of TxFJ it generates. Because a pure non-cooperative game may not have Nash equilibria that result in (Pareto-)optimal secrecy sum-rate, we propose a modified price-based game, in which each link is penalized for generating interference on other legitimate links. Under the exact knowledge of eavesdropping channels, we show that the price-based game has a comparable secrecy sum-rate to a centralized approach. We then relax the assumption of knowledge of eavesdropping channels, and leverage mixed-strategy games to provide robust solutions to the distributed secrecy sum-rate maximization problem.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalIEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - Jun 25 2018

Fingerprint

Secure Communication
Jamming
Game theory
MIMO systems
Multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
Transmitters
Interference
Game
Non-cooperative Game
Information Rates
Mixed Strategy
Game Theory
Nash Equilibrium
Leverage
Transmitter
Maximise
Secure communication
Knowledge

Keywords

  • Eavesdropping
  • friendly jamming
  • Games
  • Interference
  • Jamming
  • MIMO communication
  • pricing
  • pure and mixed-strategy games
  • Transmitters
  • Wireless communication
  • Wiretap interference network

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science Applications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

Power Games for Secure Communications in Single-stream MIMO Interference Networks. / Siyari, Peyman; Krunz, Marwan M; Nguyen, Diep.

In: IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, 25.06.2018.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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