Price formats for branded components in industrial markets: An integration of transaction cost economics and the resource-based view

Desmond Ho Fu Lo, Kellilynn M. Frias, Mrinal G Ghosh

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we propose an approach to show how the capability-based perspective of the resource-based view of the firm can be integrated with the comparative-governance approach of transaction cost economics to shed light on governance issues in interfirm relationships. We argue that transacting parties create value not only through the employment of partner-specific investment and coordination activities but also through the employment of heterogeneous, firm-specific resources that each firm brings to the relationship and that, in turn, governance structures reflect a discriminating alignment with these two distinct forms of value-creating activities and resources. Our thesis is empirically tested in the context of industrial original equipment manufacturers employing branded component contracts with independent component vendors. Specifically, we investigate the conditions under which the price terms for branded components are agreed upon (more fixed) ex ante versus negotiated (more flexible) ex post. Our results offer two insights. First, the chosen governance form reflects a trade-off between safeguarding and adaptation motives even among parties engaged in cooperative relationships. Second, valuable, firm-specific resources that preexist outside of the exchange relationship are at stake in these cooperative yet contractually incomplete relationships. They, together with relationship-specific investments and activities, have a significant impact on governance design.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1282-1297
Number of pages16
JournalOrganization Science
Volume23
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - 2012

Fingerprint

Economics
Costs
Resource-based view
Industrial markets
Governance
Transaction cost economics
Resources
Vendors
Specific investments
Interfirm relationships
Resource-based view of the firm
Trade-offs
Heterogeneous firms
Relationship-specific investments
Integrated
Alignment
Exchange relationships
Original equipment manufacturers
Governance form
Governance structure

Keywords

  • Branded components
  • Interorganizational relationships
  • Pricing
  • Resource-based view
  • Transaction cost economics

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Management of Technology and Innovation
  • Strategy and Management
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

Cite this

Price formats for branded components in industrial markets : An integration of transaction cost economics and the resource-based view. / Lo, Desmond Ho Fu; Frias, Kellilynn M.; Ghosh, Mrinal G.

In: Organization Science, Vol. 23, No. 5, 2012, p. 1282-1297.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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