Pricing and allocation for quality-differentiated online services

Ravi Bapna, Paulo B Goes, Alok Gupta

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

15 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We explore the problem of pricing and allocation of unique, one-time digital products in the form of data streams. We look at the short-term problem where the firm has a capacitated shared resource and multiple products or service levels. We formulate the allocatively efficient Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) for our setting and point out the computational challenges in determining the individual discriminatory transfer payments. We propose an alternative uniform-price, computationally efficient, revenue-maximizing knapsack formulation called the Multiple Vickrey Auction (MVA). While not incentive compatible, the MVA mechanism achieves bounded posterior regret and can be solved in real time. It has the added benefit of realizing imputed commodity prices for the various services, a feature lacking in the discriminatory GVA approach. For service providers that are concerned about the incentive compatibility but want imputed service prices, we suggest a maximal MVA (mMVA) uniform-pricing scheme that trades off revenue maximization for allocative efficiency. For sake of completeness we discuss the properties of a first-price pay-your-bid scheme. While NP-hard and not incentive compatible, this formulation has the perceived benefit of cognitive simplicity on the parts of sellers and bidders.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1141-1150
Number of pages10
JournalManagement Science
Volume51
Issue number7
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2005
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Costs
Online services
Vickrey auction
Pricing
Incentive compatible
Service provider
Service levels
Revenue
Bid
Digital products
Trade-offs
Shared resources
Seller
Commodity prices
Incentive compatibility
Simplicity
Allocative efficiency
Data streams
Uniform price
Transfer payments

Keywords

  • Auctions to reveal valuations of one-time services
  • Nonstandard knapsack formulation
  • Quality-of-service-oriented digital services

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Management of Technology and Innovation
  • Strategy and Management
  • Management Science and Operations Research

Cite this

Pricing and allocation for quality-differentiated online services. / Bapna, Ravi; Goes, Paulo B; Gupta, Alok.

In: Management Science, Vol. 51, No. 7, 07.2005, p. 1141-1150.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Bapna, Ravi ; Goes, Paulo B ; Gupta, Alok. / Pricing and allocation for quality-differentiated online services. In: Management Science. 2005 ; Vol. 51, No. 7. pp. 1141-1150.
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