Prolegomena to a future phenomenology of morals

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Moral phenomenology is (roughly) the study of those features of occurrent mental states with moral significance which are accessible through direct introspection, whether or not such states possess phenomenal character - a what-it-is-likeness. In this paper, as the title indicates, we introduce and make prefatory remarks about moral phenomenology and its significance for ethics. After providing a brief taxonomy of types of moral experience, we proceed to consider questions about the commonality within and distinctiveness of such experiences, with an eye on some of the main philosophical issues in ethics and how moral phenomenology might be brought to bear on them. In discussing such matters, we consider some of the doubts about moral phenomenology and its value to ethics that are brought up by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Michael Gill in their contributions to this issue.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)115-131
Number of pages17
JournalPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Volume7
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2008

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phenomenology
Ethics
moral philosophy
introspection
taxonomy
experience
Phenomenology
Prolegomena
Values

Keywords

  • Moral experience
  • Moral judgment
  • Moral objectivity
  • Moral phenomenology

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences(all)

Cite this

Prolegomena to a future phenomenology of morals. / Horgan, Terence E; Timmons, Mark C.

In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 7, No. 1, 03.2008, p. 115-131.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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