Publisher click fraud in the pay-per-click advertising market: Incentives and consequences

Xiarong Li, Yong Liu, Daniel Zeng

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

Pay-per-click (PPC) advertising is being seriously threatened by the click fraud (CF). In this paper, we report a game-theoretic analysis of the incentives and consequences of CF involving Web content publishers. We find that the publisher competition induces CF, harming the efficiency especially the publisher payoff allocation in the market.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of 2011 IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics, ISI 2011
Pages207-209
Number of pages3
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 22 2011
Event2011 IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics, ISI 2011 - Beijing, China
Duration: Jul 10 2011Jul 12 2011

Publication series

NameProceedings of 2011 IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics, ISI 2011

Other

Other2011 IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics, ISI 2011
CountryChina
CityBeijing
Period7/10/117/12/11

Keywords

  • PPC advertising
  • click fraud
  • sponsored search

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Information Systems

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    Li, X., Liu, Y., & Zeng, D. (2011). Publisher click fraud in the pay-per-click advertising market: Incentives and consequences. In Proceedings of 2011 IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics, ISI 2011 (pp. 207-209). [5984082] (Proceedings of 2011 IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics, ISI 2011). https://doi.org/10.1109/ISI.2011.5984082