Abstract
Quineans have taken the basic expression of ontological commitment to be an assertion of the form '∃xφ', assimilated to the English 'there is something that is a φ'. Here I take the existential quantifier to be introduced, not as an abbreviation for an expression of English, but via Tarskian semantics. I argue, contrary to the standard view, that Tarskian semantics in fact suggests a quite different picture: one in which quantification is of a substitutional type apparently first proposed by Geach. The ontological burden is borne by constant symbols, and truth is defined separately from reference.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1-43 |
| Number of pages | 43 |
| Journal | Synthese |
| Volume | 124 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| State | Published - Jul 2000 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Sciences(all)
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Quantification and ontology. / Lavine, Shaughan M.
In: Synthese, Vol. 124, No. 1, 07.2000, p. 1-43.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Quantification and ontology
AU - Lavine, Shaughan M
PY - 2000/7
Y1 - 2000/7
N2 - Quineans have taken the basic expression of ontological commitment to be an assertion of the form '∃xφ', assimilated to the English 'there is something that is a φ'. Here I take the existential quantifier to be introduced, not as an abbreviation for an expression of English, but via Tarskian semantics. I argue, contrary to the standard view, that Tarskian semantics in fact suggests a quite different picture: one in which quantification is of a substitutional type apparently first proposed by Geach. The ontological burden is borne by constant symbols, and truth is defined separately from reference.
AB - Quineans have taken the basic expression of ontological commitment to be an assertion of the form '∃xφ', assimilated to the English 'there is something that is a φ'. Here I take the existential quantifier to be introduced, not as an abbreviation for an expression of English, but via Tarskian semantics. I argue, contrary to the standard view, that Tarskian semantics in fact suggests a quite different picture: one in which quantification is of a substitutional type apparently first proposed by Geach. The ontological burden is borne by constant symbols, and truth is defined separately from reference.
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M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:33746150889
VL - 124
SP - 1
EP - 43
JO - Synthese
JF - Synthese
SN - 0039-7857
IS - 1
ER -